Abstract Crypto-computing is a set of well-known techniques for computing with encrypted data. The security of the corresponding protocols are usually proven in the semi-honest model. In this work, we propose a new class of zeroknowledge proofs, which are tailored for crypto-computing protocols. First, these proofs directly employ properties of the underlying crypto systems and thus many facts have more concise proofs compared to generic solutions. Second, we show how to achieve universal composability in the trusted set-up model where all zero-knowledge proofs share the same system-wide parameters. Third, we derive a new protocol for multiplicative relations and show how to combine it with several crypto-computing frameworks to get security in the malicious model.
Introduction
There are two basic approaches for crypto-computing: garbled circuit evaluation and protocols for computing with ciphertexts. Garbled circuit evaluation is known to be Turing complete [Yao82, BHR12] , while the computational expressibility of ciphertext manipulation depends on the underlying cryptosystem [SYY99, IP07, Gen09] . In this work, we consider only the ciphertext manipulation protocols. These protocols often rely on the specific properties of the underlying plaintexts, e.g., they assume that the encrypted inputs are binary. If these conditions are not satisfied, these protocols often break down and even the privacy of inputs is not guaranteed. For instance, see the motivating discussion in [AIR01, LL07] . Hence, these protocols are often complemented with zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee security in the malicious model.
Conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) can be used as a lightweight alternative to zero knowledge proofs [GIKM98, AIR01, LL07] . In a nutshell, CDS protocols are used to release secrets only if received ciphertexts satisfy a desired relation. If we use these secrets to encrypt replies in the original protocol, these replies become unreadable when the ciphertexts are malformed. The resulting protocol is extremely lightweight, as the transformation adds only few extra ciphertexts and some additional crypto-computing steps. On the flip side, CDS transformation ensures only input-privacy.
In this work, we extend this approach to full-fledged zero-knowledge proofs by adding a few short messages. As relatively efficient CDS protocols exist for proving NP/poly relations between plaintexts [AIR01,LL07], our method can be used to get zero-knowledge proofs for any NP language. It is a new and interesting paradigm for constructing zero-knowledge proofs, as resulting CDSZK protocols do not follow standard sigma structure. In particular, note that parties do not have to agree before the protocol execution whether they aim for input-privacy, honest verifier or full-fledged zero-knowledge. This can be decided dynamically during the protocol with no overhead. For many zero-knowledge techniques, where the full-fledged zero-knowledge is achieved by adding extra messages into the beginning of the protocol, such flexibility is unachievable without additional overhead. On the flip side, our proofs cannot be made non-interactive by using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] .
Properties of our these zero-knowledge protocols are largely determined by the underlying commitment scheme. Essentially, we must choose between perfect simulation and statistical soundness. For perfect simulatability, the commitment scheme must be equivocal and thus security guarantees hold only against computationally bounded provers. Statistical binding assures unconditional soundness but it also prevents statistical simulatability. Finally, usage of trusted setup together with dual mode commitments assures universal composability even if the setup is shared between all protocols.
As the second major contribution, we describe a CDS protocol for a multiplicative relation with the cost of two additional ciphertexts. This is a major advancement, as CDS protocols with a constant blowup in communication were known for proving linear relations between plaintexts and all previous CDS protocols for multiplicative relation had a quadratic overhead in communication. This result is important as many crypto-computing protocols can be made secure against active attacks by verifying multiplicative relations. In Section 6, we show how the CDSZKMUL protocol can be used to prevent active attacks for three different crypto-computing platforms.
As CDS and CDSZK protocols are mostly applied for protecting crypto-computing protocols against malicious adversaries, it is important to prove that the security is preserved even if the same public key is used in many protocols. To address this issue, we state and prove the results in trusted setup model. After that we show how the setup can be implemented in the standard or in the common reference string model. For clarity, all of our results are formalised in the concrete security framework and statements about polynomial model are obtained by considering the asymptotic behaviour.
A new CDS protocol for multiplicative relation is presented in Section 4 and main results about zero-knowledge proofs are presented in Section 5. Hence, a reader who is familiar with basics of conditional disclosure of secrets can skip Sections 2 and 3.
Preliminaries
We use boldface letters for vectors and calligraphic letters for sets and algorithms. A shorthand m ← M denotes that m is chosen uniformly from a set M. A shorthand A ≡ B denotes that either distributions or elements A and B are identical. All algorithms are assumed to be specified as inputs (programs) to a universal Turing machine U. A t-time algorithm is an algorithm that is guaranteed to stop in t time steps. In particular note that the program length of a t-time algorithm must be less than t bits. 1 Homomorphic encryption. As all protocols for conditional disclosure of secrets are based on homomorphic encryption schemes, we have to formalise corresponding security notions. A public key encryption scheme is specified by a triple of efficient algorithms (gen, enc, dec). The probabilistic key generation algorithm gen generates a public key pk and a secret key sk. The deterministic algorithms enc pk : M pk × R pk → C pk and dec sk : C pk → M pk are used for encryption and decryption, where the message space M pk , the randomness space R pk and the ciphertext space C pk might depend on pk. As usual, we denote the distribution of ciphertexts enc pk (m; r) for r ← R pk by enc pk (m) for short, when the randomness is not important in the context.
In this work, we put two important additional restrictions to the encryption scheme. First, encryption scheme must be with perfect decryption:
Second, membership for the set C pk must be efficiently testable given pk, i.e., everybody should be able to tell whether a message is a valid ciphertext or not.
We say that an encryption scheme is additively homomorphic if
and multiplicatively homomorphic if
where the equivalence means that the corresponding distributions coincide. vectorised First of all, this definition directly implies that if a fixed ciphertext enc pk (m 1 ) is multiplied with a freshly generated enc pk (m 2 ) then nothing except m 1 + m 2 or m 1 · m 2 can be deduced from the resulting ciphertext. Secondly, the message space must be cyclic or a direct product of cyclic subgroups. In the following, we refer to these as simple and vectorised cryptosystems to make a clear distinction. An encryption scheme is (t, ε)-IND-CPA secure, if for any t-time adversary A, the corresponding distinguishing advantage is bounded:
The ElGamal [EG85] and Paillier [Pai99] cryptosystems are the most commonly used cryptosystems that satisfy all these requirements under standard number theoretic assumptions. The ElGamal cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomorphic and the ciphertext space has an efficient membership test if it is built on top of elliptic curve with prime number of elements. The Paillier encryption and its extension Damgård-Jurik [DJ01] cryptosystem are additively homomorphic with ciphertext space Z * N k , which is also efficiently testable. Both of these cryptosystems have a cyclic message space. Many somewhat fully homomorphic cryptosystems can be converted to vectorised cryptosystems for to reduce overhead in ciphertext size [SV11, GHS12] .
Commitment schemes. Secondly, we need an equivocal commitments. A commitment scheme is specified by triple of efficient probabilistic algorithms (gen, com, open). The algorithm gen fixes public parameters ck. The algorithm com ck : M ck → C ck × D ck maps messages into commitment and decommitment pairs. A commitment is opened by applying an algorithm open ck : C ck × D ck → M ck ∪ {⊥} where the symbol ⊥ indicates that the commitment-decommitment pair is invalid. We assume that
A commitment scheme is (t, ε)-hiding, if for any t-time adversary A, the corresponding distinguishing advantage is bounded by ε:
A commitment scheme is (t, ε)-binding, if for any t-time adversary A, the probability of successful double-openings is bounded by ε:
A commitment is ε-binding if the bound holds for all adversaries. A commitment scheme is perfectly equivocal if there exists a modified setup procedure gen * that in addition to ck produces an equivocation key ek and algorithms com * ek and equiv ek . The first algorithm com * ek returns a fake commitment c * together with a trapdoor information σ such that the invocation of equiv ek (σ, m) produces a valid decommitment d * for m, i.e., open ck (c * , d * ) = m. More over, for any message m ∈ M ck the distribution (c * , d * ) must coincide with the distribution generated by com ck (m).
In some proofs, we need commitments that are simultaneously equivocal and ε-binding. Of course, such a scheme cannot exist. However, if two commitment schemes use the same algorithms com and open for committing and decommitting, and commitment parameters ck are (t, ε 1 )-indistinguishable then we get a chameleon like behaviour. Namely, if the first commitment scheme is perfectly equivocal and the second ε 2 -binding, we can switch the key generation algorithms during security analysis and use both properties. This construction 2 is known as a (t, ε 1 )-equivocal and ε 2 -binding dual-mode commitment.
Such commitments can be constructed from additively homomorphic encryption [GOS06] . Let e ← enc pk (1) together with pk be the commitment key. Then we can commit m ∈ M pk by computing c ← e m · enc pk (0; r) for r ← R. To open c, we have to release m and r. This construction is perfectly binding. To assure equivocality, we can set e ← enc pk (0; r * ) for some r * ← R. Then a commitment c ≡ enc pk (0) and we can express c = e m · enc pk (0; r) provided that r * is known. It is easy to see that (t, ε)-IND-CPA security is sufficient to guarantee hiding and computational indistinguishability of commitment keys. As you never need to decrypt during the equivocation, the construction can be based on lifted ElGamal or Paillier encryption scheme.
Trusted setup model. In this model, a trusted dealer T computes and privately distributes all public and secret parameters according to some procedure π ts . For instance, T might set up a public key infrastructure or generate a common reference string. In practical applications, the trusted setup π ts is commonly implemented as a secure twoor multi-party protocol run in isolation. Hence, protocols with trusted setup are practical only if many protocols can share the same setup without rapid decrease in security.
Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
A conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) is a two-message protocol between a client P and a server V where the client learns a secret s specified by the server only if its encrypted inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) satisfy a public predicate φ(x). The server should learn nothing beyond the vector of encryptions (q 1 , . . . , q n ). We also assume that the client knows the secret key sk or has access to the decryption oracle, whereas the server knows only the public key pk. These protocols are often used as implicit sub-protocols in more complex crypto-computing protocols, see for example [AIR01, BK04] .
The simplest of such protocols is a disclose-if-one protocol, where the client P learns the secret only if the server V receives encryption of one. For clarity, let us consider cryptosystems with a cyclic plaintext space of size n. A standard way to build such a protocol relies on the fact that
when the underlying encryption scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic. Let n is publicly known prime and e be chosen uniformly from Z n . Then it is easy to prove that x e · s is uniformly distributed over M pk if x = 1 and x e · s = s otherwise. The latter forms a core of many CDS constructions [AIR01, BGN05] . For additively homomorphic encryption schemes, we can utilise the equality
to construct a disclose-if-zero protocol. As commonly used additively homomorphic encryption schemes have a composite plaintext space Z N , extra care is required to address cases when x is non-trivial factor of N . The corresponding protocol together with standard extensions can be found in [LL07] . In brief, the protocol use a specific function pair (encode, decode) to double encrypt secrets. The restriction ∀s ∈ S : decode(encode(s)) ≡ s .
guarantees a correct recovery of the secret when the query is valid (e.g. x = 0). At the same time, encode(s) must contain enough randomness so that additive noise from a small subgroup can hide the secret when the query is invalid. We say that the encoding is ε-secure if for any s ∈ S and for any non-zero additive subgroup G ⊆ M pk , encode(s) + G is statistically ε-close to uniform distribution over M pk . If the message space M pk has a prime order, the only non-zero subgroup is M pk and thus identity function is perfectly secure. The same definition is applicable also for the vectorised cryptosystems. However, the information about s must be split between different plaintext components to assure security. For instance, if the plaintext space is Z p × Z p , the subgroup generated by (0, 1) is non-zero while the first component of encode(s) + G comes without a protective noise.
For composite message spaces Z N , we can choose t randomly from Z N/2 and set encode(s) = s + 2 · t to encode -bit secrets. Laur and Lipmaa showed that this encoding is 2 −1 /γ-secure where γ is the smallest factor of N and there are no alternative encoding functions with significantly longer secrets [LL07] . See App. A for a more detailed discussion about optimality. This construction can be lifted to the vectorised setting provided that all plaintext components have the same public order n as in [SV11,GHS12,DPSZ12]. To encode s, we first use additive secret sharing to split s into the sum s 1 + · · · + s k and then use encode function for each component s i separately. By the construction, the noise hides at least one component s i if G = {0} and thus the secret s becomes unreconstructable.
The complexity of CDS protocol depends on the predicate. For instance, it is rather straightforward to construct CDS protocols for all monotone predicates if the input x is a bit vector [AIR01, LL07] . These constructions can be used as a basis for more complex predicates. In particular, note that for any predicate φ(x) there exists a constant depth monotonous predicate ψ(x, w) such that
and w can be efficiently computed 3 from x and φ. Moreover, the circuit complexity of ψ is linear in the circuit complexity of φ. As a result, efficient CDS protocols exist for all predicates provided that the client is willing to encrypt w besides x and the server is willing to combine encryptions. See [AIR01,LL07] for more detailed discussions.
We specify a CDS protocol by a triple of algorithms (query, answer, recov) where the client's query is computed as q ← query pk (x, w) and server's reply as a ← answer pk (q, s; r) for r ← R. The client recovers a secret by computing recov sk (a). Many CDS protocol also specifies how the server must combine ciphertexts to get the desired encryptions from the CDS protocol. However, this can be thought as a separate local post-processing step and thus we omit it form the protocol description.
For clarity, let Q inv denote the set of all invalid queries, i.e., queries for which ψ(x, w) = 0 or which contain invalid ciphertext or are otherwise malformed.
All standard implementations of CDS protocols are secure in the relaxed model, where the client can be maliciously corrupted and the server can only be semi-honestly corrupted. Formally, a security definition should be expressed in terms of simulator constructions. However, as the protocol structure is so simple, we can be more explicit. Namely, a CDS protocol is (ε, t a )-client-private, if for any t a -time stateful adversary A, the next inequality holds:
To prove server-privacy, we need an efficient algorithm answer * pk (q) for faking replies of incorrect queries q ∈ Q inv without knowing the secret s. A CDS protocol is ε-server private if, for all valid public keys pk and secrets s and for all invalid queries q, the statistical distance between the distributions answer pk (q, s) and answer * pk (q) is at most ε. The corresponding simulation construction in the trusted setup model, where P and T are guaranteed to know the secret key sk, is straightforward, since the simulator can decrypt q in order to test q ∈ Q inv and later use answer pk (q, s) or answer * pk (q) to simulate the replay to P * . As the statistical distance of replies is at most ε, the joint output distribution is also at most ε apart, see [LL07] for further details.
It is also worth mentioning that the communication complexity of CDS protocols reduces drastically if the underlying cryptosystem is (somewhat) fully homomorphic, e.g. [GHS12, BGV12] , instead of additively or multiplicatively homomorphic encryption schemes used in standard crypto-computing protocols.
A New CDS Protocol for a Multiplicative Relation
For clarity, we specify the solution for additively homomorphic encryption and then discuss how the same protocol can be used together with lifted cryptosystems, which can fully decrypt only a small fraction of ciphertexts. This aspect is important, as additively homomorphic cryptosystems can be obtained form multiplicative cryptosystems through lifting. We stress that the protocol works also for vectorised cryptosystems.
Let enc pk (x 1 ), enc pk (x 2 ) and enc pk (x 3 ) be the ciphertexts sent by the client P and let s ∈ S be the secret picked by the server V. Then the client should learn s only if the multiplicative relation x 1 x 2 = x 3 holds between plaintexts. Figure 1 depicts the corresponding CDSMUL protocol. Theorem 1. If the encryption scheme is (t, ε 1 )-IND-CPA secure and encode is ε 2 -secure, the CDSMUL protocol is (t, 3ε 1 )-client and ε 2 -server private.
Proof. As the output computed by the client satisfies the following equation
the client is guaranteed to recover the secret s when x 1 x 2 = x 3 . If x 1 x 2 = x 3 the term (x 3 −x 1 x 2 )e 1 adds additive noise to the payload. As the order of any cyclic subgroup of M pk divides n, δn = 0 for any δ ∈ M pk . Consequently, the set G = {δm : m ∈ Z n } is an additive cyclic subgroup of M pk generated by δ. As the order of δ divides n, the term (x 3 − x 1 x 2 )e 1 is uniformly distributed over the additive subgroup G. Consequently, we GLOBAL PARAMETERS: Both parties know functions encode and decode for secrets. The client P has a secret key sk and the server V has the corresponding public key pk. Let n be a publicly known common multiple of all cyclic subgroup sizes in M pk . SERVER'S SECRET: The server V wants to release a secret s ∈ S.
QUERY: The client P sends q = (q1, q2, q3) to the verifier V. ANSWER: The server V picks e1, e2 ← Zn and and responds with the following messages:
2 · enc pk (encode(s)) .
RECOVERY: P computes di ← dec sk (ui) for i ∈ {1, 2} and uses the known plaintext value x2 = dec sk (q2) to compute the output s ← decode(d2 − x2d1).
Figure1. CDS protocol CDSMUL for multiplicative relation.
. By the assumptions G + encode(s) is ε 2 -close to the uniform distribution over M pk . More importantly, the distribution of d 2 − x 2 d 1 is also independent form e 2 . Since e 2 perfectly masks the term x 1 e 1 in d 1 , we can simulate the replies u 1 and u 2 by encrypting two random messages. The claim on client-privacy is straightforward.
Remarks. First, note that the protocol has perfect server-privacy when the message space is cyclic and has a prime order, since the identity function as encode has perfect privacy. Additive secret sharing works for the case where all non-trivial cyclic subgroups have the same prime order. Also, note that the Paillier cryptosystem is special, as the message space M pk concedes with the randomisation set Z n .
Second, note that the protocol does not work directly with lifted cryptosystems. Recall that in such schemes the new encryption rule enc pk (x) = enc pk (g x ) is defined in terms of the old multiplicatively homomorphic encryption rule enc pk (·) and a generator of the plaintext space g. The resulting scheme is additively homomorphic, but discrete logarithm must be taken to complete the decryption. Hence, we cannot blindly follow the reconstruction phase in CDSMUL protocol. Still, the client can employ the old decryption algorithm and compute g d1 and g d2 from the lifted ciphertexts u 1 and u 2 . Since the client knows x 2 , he or she can compute a partial decryption
In case of the lifted ElGamal encryption, the message space is of prime order and we can use identity as encode. Thus, the client can recover g s instead of s. The latter is not a problem, since we can use g s as a secret. For more exotic lifted cryptosystems with composite message spaces, such as [BGN05] , encode function must be such that secret could be extracted from g encode(s) without computing a discrete logarithm.
TRUSTED SETUP πts Dealer generates commitment parameters ck ← cs.gen and broadcast ck to everyone. Dealer runs (pk, sk) ← pkc.gen and broadcasts pk as a public key of P to everyone. Dealer sends the secret key sk securely to the prover P.
MESSAGE FORMATION. The CDS protocol is chosen according to the predicate ψ.
The prover P sends q ← query pk (x, w) to the verifier V.
PROOF PHASE. A statement to be proved is q / ∈ Qinv.
1. V chooses s ← S and r ← R and sends a ← answer pk (q, s; r) to P. 2. P recovers s ← recov sk (a), computes (c, d) ← cs.com ck (s) and sends c to V. 3. V reveals (s, r) to P who aborts if a = answer pk (q, s; r). Figure2. Zero-knowledge proof of correctness CDSZK for encryptions.
From Conditional Disclosure of Secret to Zero Knowledge
We can convert any CDS protocol into honest verifier zero-knowledge proof. Indeed, if the client P sends the secret s back to the semihonest server V then nothing is leaked but at the same time V is able to detect if P is cheating or not. To prohibit malicious behaviour, V should prove knowledge of s and randomness r ∈ R needed to compute the reply answer pk (q, s; r). Since neither s nor r are among private inputs, V can release them so that P can repeat the computations of answer pk (q, s; r). As the latter also reveals the secret, P must commit to its reply before the pair (s, r) is released. The corresponding zero-knowledge protocol is depicted in Figure 2 . Depending on the properties of commitment scheme and the CDS protocol, we get zero-knowledge protocols with different properties. From now on, we refer to P as a prover and V as a verifier.
Formal Security Definitions
As our aim is to use instances of CDSZK protocols together with crypto-computing protocols, we have to show that the protocol instances are concurrently composable with any other protocol after an initial setup phase is completed and shared among many instances. Also, note that statements to be proved can depend on common parameters z shared by all participants after the trusted setup. Hence, the language of all valid statements
must be specified by an efficiently decidable ternary predicate ψ * . As usual x is the protocol input (statement) and w is the witness. In case of a CDSZK protocol, pk is the common parameter shared by many CDSZK protocols, q is the protocol input, sk is the witness, and q ∈ L pk if and only if q / ∈ Q inv (pk). Indeed, the knowledge of sk allows us to decrypt q to obtain x and then just output φ(x) as ψ * (pk, q, sk).
A proof system is determined by two algorithms P and V which specify the actions of the prover and the verifier, respectively. The prover P takes (x, w) as inputs and the verifier V takes x as an input. Additionally, both algorithms can access various parameters distributed to them by the setup π ts . For brevity, let [P, V] (x) denote the verifiers output after the interaction with P(x, w). Then a proof system is perfectly complete if all valid statement are provable, i.e., [P, V] (x) ≡ 1 for all possible runs of π ts and for all statements x ∈ L z and corresponding witnesses w.
We formalise the security of a zero-knowledge protocol by specifying the ideal functionality. An ideal implementation of a zero knowledge proof is a restricted communication channel π
• ψ * between a prover P and a verifier V. More precisely, when the prover P provides an input x then the verifier V obtains
where the set of shared parameters z is determined by the trusted setup π
• ψ denote a compound protocol, which internally uses a single instance of π ts and instances of π • ψi . Let E π ts , π ρ , . . . , π ρ be a real world implementation with a modified trusted setup π ts and real instantiations of zero knowledge protocols π ψi . Then we would like that both compound protocols have comparable security against plausible attacks. The corresponding formalisation is rather technical. Hence, we only highlight the major aspects in the formal definition and refer to the thorough treatments [Can01, Lin03] for further details.
First of all, we consider only security against static corruption but semi-adaptively chosen contexts 4 , i.e., the adversary must decide before the execution which of two parties it corrupts. However, the adversary can choose the computational context E based on the outputs received in π ts . Secondly, we limit the overall amount of computations. We say that E is a t e -time computational context if the maximal amount of computation steps done by E disregarding invocations of π ψi is bounded by t e . Thirdly, we assume that the communication is asynchronous. Now let ξ denote inputs of all parties and let ζ • and ζ denote joint outputs of all parties in the ideal and real execution. Then a protocol π ρ is (t e , t a , f, t d , ε)-universally composable in the shared setup model if for any t e -time E and for any t a -time adversary A against π there exists f (t a )-time adversary A
• against π • such that for any input ξ distributions ζ
• and ζ are (t d , ε)-indistinguishable. We omit t d if ζ • and ζ are statistically indistinguishable. Note that the definition is meaningful only if f is a low-degree polynomial. Otherwise, the running-time of A
• might be too large for further analysis of E π 
Soundness Guarantees for CDSZK
To simplify the security analysis, we first prove that usage of statistically binding commitments assures soundness. Recall that a proof system π is ε-unsound if for any prover P * and adaptively chosen statement x the deception probability is bounded by ε:
where the probability is taken over all possible runs of the setup procedure π ts and P * can choose the statement x based on all public and private parameters received during π ts . An argument system π is (t, ε)-unsound if for any t-time P * the deception probability is bounded: Adv
Theorem 2. If the commitment scheme is ε 2 -binding and CDS protocol is ε 3 -server private, CDSZK protocol is 1 |S| + ε 2 + ε 3 -unsound for any P * . If the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, a stronger claim holds :
Proof. Consider a modified protocol where a is replaced with answer * pk (q) whenever q ∈ Q inv . As the CDS protocol is ε 3 -server private, the replacement can reduce the deception probability at most by ε 3 . Let c denote the the commitment issued in the modified protocol and let d * ∈ D be the first valid decommitment for c according to some fixed ordering of D. Letŝ = open ck (c, d * ) be the corresponding opening. Then To complete the proof, note that the fake reply answer * pk (q) is independent of s and thus
For the strengthened claim, note that answer * pk and answer pk (q, s) are ε 3 close for any valid pk. Now if the commitment is perfectly binding then s =ŝ for any ck and we get the desired bound. Surprisingly enough, computational binding alone is not sufficient for soundness against time-bounded provers. The CDSZK protocol is sound only if the underlying CDS protocol is equivocal for incorrect queries. The latter is a non-trivial property to achieve. See Appendix C for further discussion.
Universal Composability of CDSZK
We first prove that CDSZK protocol is universally composable if we use dual-mode commitments with appropriate parameters. After that we study what can be proved in the standard model, see App. B. For clarity, we have omitted O( ) terms from restrictions including the total time complexity of CDS protocols. Proof. For brevity, let us prove the claim for two-party setting as the argumentation directly generalises for multi-party setting. Let P 1 denote the honest and P 2 the corrupted party. Let E π denote a compound protocol with ideal implementations and let E π ts , π ψ1 , . . . , π ψ be the corresponding real world implementation. Let A denote a malicious real world adversary.
To convert A to an equivalent ideal world adversary A • , we need to simulate π ts given only access to π • ts and all instances of π ψi given access to π • ψi . The simulation of π ts is trivial, since π • ts delivers all messages as π ts except for the commitment key ck. For the latter, the simulator A
• computes (ck, ek) ← gen * , deliver ck to A and stores the equivocation key ek for later use.
When A plays a role of a prover, A • just simulates actions of honest verifier V and forwards the query q to trusted third party T. The simulation is always possible as V has no inputs. The simulation construction for the protocol instances where A acts as verifier is depicted on Figure 3 . Let (c, d) denote the commitment and decommitment values used in π ψi and (c * , d * ) the corresponding values computed in the simulation. Since the commitment is perfectly equivocal, distributions of c and c * coincide. Next, note that if a = answer pk (q, s; r), then honest prover would have committed s. Consequently, if corrupted P 2 releases values s, r such that a = answer pk (q, s; r), the distribution of (c, d) and (c * , d * ) coincides, again. Hence, simulation of π ψi is perfect.
Although A • simulates perfectly all protocol executions, A • accepts some proofs for invalid queries. In the binding mode, such events occur with probability ε s = 1 |S| + ε 2 + ε 3 per each protocol instance. As ck is only hiding such events can occur at probability ε s + ε 1 if t a + t e + O( ) ≤ t. Otherwise, we can use the real world execution for distinguishing between commitment keys. Consequently, the ideal world execution can diverge from real world execution with with probability ε s + ε 1 .
Corollary 1.
If the commitment scheme is used in the binding mode, the CDSZK protocol is (t e , t a , O(t a ), t d , (
Proof. Note that t d algorithm can distinguish real executions with different commitment modes with probability ε 1 if t ≥ t a + t e + t d + O( ). Hence, the simulation construction from Thm. 3 is sufficient.
Remark about public keys. Both proofs implicitly assume that P 1 and P 2 prove statements with respect to different secret keys. Otherwise, sending query vectors to each other is insecure, as the other party could extract plaintexts from the query q.
Zero-knowledge proofs for any NP language. The CDSZK protocol can be directly converted to general purpose zero-knowledge proof for any NP statement. Let ψ(x, w) be the predicate that checks validity of the witness w and the statement x. Now if we encrypt w, then we can use CDSZK to prove that we have indeed encrypted a witness to public statement x. Since relatively efficient CDS protocols exist for any circuit [AIR01, LL07] , the resulting CDSZK protocol is rather efficient.
Securing Crypto-computations Against Active Attacks
There are many ways how to implement secure computations with additively or multiplicatively homomorphic encryption in the semi-honest model. In the following, we show how to combine these techniques with CDSZK protocols to get security against malicious attacks.
Crypto-computing in Asymmetric Setting
Let us consider a setting where the client knows the public key pk of the server and the server helps him or her to perform various operations on the ciphertexts. As the cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, the client can compute encryptions of affine functions without the help from the server. Hence, the client needs help only for computing enc pk (x 1 x 2 ) from enc pk (x 1 ) and enc pk (x 2 ). In the semihonest model, the client can use blinding to shift the task back to the server [AF90,CIK
+ 01]. Namely, the client can generate two random masks r 1 , r 2 ← M pk and send enc pk (x 1 + r 1 ) and enc pk (x 2 + r 2 ) to the server. Due to the homomorphic properties (see Eq. (1)), the client can compute enc pk (x 1 x 2 ) from the servers reply enc pk ((x 1 + r 1 )(x 2 + r 2 )) as enc pk ((x 1 + r 1 )(x 2 + r 2 ))enc pk (x 2 + r 2 ) −r1 enc pk (x 1 ) −r2 .
As the server is malicious, he or she must prove that enc pk (x 1 + r 1 ), enc pk (x 2 + r 2 ), enc pk ((x 1 + r 1 )(x 2 + r 2 )) are in multiplicative relation. By using out new CDSMUL together with the CDSZK construction, we obtain security against malicious servers with a protocol that has roughly tripled communication and computation. The exact overhead depends on the cryptosystem. Since addition and multiplication is enough to represent any function, the client can compute an encryption of any function. Hence, we are left with the problem how the server can decrypt the final output without learning the outcome. In the semi-honest model, the client can mask the final outcome by sending enc pk (y + r) for decryption. In the malicious model, the server can lie about decryption and must add correctness proof. There are many efficient protocols for specific cryptosystems. However, we can use also CDSZK protocol, since after obtaining x ← dec sk (c), the client can compute enc pk (−x)c which is enc pk (0) only if x was correctly computed.
Crypto-computing in Symmetric Setting
Let us consider a symmetric setting where each party has a secret keys and the opponent knows their public key. As a party can decrypt only ciphertexts corresponding to his or her secret key, we can combine additive secret sharing with encryption to get verifiable xor-secret sharing. More formally, let pk 1 and pk 2 be the public keys of P 1 and P 2 . Then a shared bit [[x] ] consists of private shares x 1 ⊕ x 2 = x and their public commitments enc pk 1 (x 1 ) and enc pk 2 (x 2 ). To get a Turing complete share-computing system, we must implement secure addition and multiplication over Z 2 .
Before that we must show how to share a secret value x. For that, a dealing party must choose x 1 ← Z 2 and set x 2 ← x ⊕ x 1 and publish enc pk 1 (x 1 ) and enc pk 2 (x 2 ). Next, the opponent obtains its share x j by decrypting and verifies that x j ∈ Z 2 . To show validity of enc pk i (x i ), P i must show that its either encryption of zero or one. The latter can be with corresponding CDSZK proof, which reply a consist of two encryptions. See [LL07] for further details.
It is easy to compute shares
, since parties can locally compute z i = x i ⊕ y i and publish enc pk 1 (z 1 ) and enc pk 2 (z 2 ). To prove the correctness of its computations, P i must show that encryptions enc pk i (x i ), enc pk i (y i ) and enc pk i (z i ) satisfy the relation 2x i y i = x i + y i − z i . As the encryption for the right hand side can be computed by the opponent, the proof can be done with a single invocation of CDSZKMUL protocol.
For the multiplication protocol note that xy = x 1 y 1 ⊕ x 1 y 2 ⊕ x 1 y 1 ⊕ x 2 y 2 where all multiplications are done over integers. As terms x i y i are locally computable, it is straightforward to create a valid sharings
Then P i must prove the relation x i y i = z 1 + z 2 − 2z 1 z 2 . Again, we need only a single CDSZKMUL protocol, since the opponent can compute the the right hand side. Xor-sharing for the terms x i y j requires cooperation. For brevity, we consider the term x 1 y 2 as the treatment of the second term is symmetrical. In this case, P 2 can generate z 2 ← Z 2 and then send
to P 1 . Next, parties publish enc pk 1 (z 1 ) and enc pk 2 (z 2 ) and P 2 proves correctness of its actions, i.e., x 1 y 2 = z 1 + z 2 − 2z 1 z 2 . Again, we need a single instance of CDSZKMUL protocol. P 1 proves analogously that enc pk 1 (z 1 ) is correct. Remarks. First, note that the lifted ElGamal cryptosystem is sufficient to implement this crypto-computing framework, since we must decrypt only encryptions in all three base protocols and modification of CDSMUL works with lifted cryptosystems. Second, it possible to implement standard batch versions of addition and multiplication protocols, which pack many inputs into a single ciphertext. Third, it is possible to use additive secret sharing over Z n provided that there are efficient protocol for computing xy − z i (mod n) and the CDS protocol for the relation x ≡ y (mod n) is also efficient enough.
Fast Beaver Triple Generation in Asymmetric Setting
A standard way to speed up multiparty computations is to split them into slow preprocessing phase and fast online phase. The VIFF framework [DGKN09] was the first practical share-computing framework to to pre-compute Beaver multiplication triples in the preprocessing phase. After that several works have used crypto-computing for generating Beaver triples [DO10, DPSZ12] to get security against of dishonest majority. In this section, we propose another alternative by borrowing some key ideas from the SPEEDZ framework [DPSZ12] . However, we use only additively homomorphic encryption instead of somewhat homomorphic encryption. The resulting protocol is computationally less demanding and relies on better-studied security assumptions. On the other hand, the overall throughput of Beaver triples per encryption operations is also much smaller. Hence, it is a mixed-bag in terms of practical efficiency.
Similarly to SPEEDZ, we use additive secret sharing x 1 + x 2 = x together with shared message authentication code z 1 + z 2 = k(x 1 + x 2 ) over M pk to obtain verifiability. Differently from SPEEDZ, we consider an asymmetric setting where P 1 generates the secret key sk and the MAC key k ← M pk and his opponent P 2 knows only the public key pk and enc pk (k). As P 1 knows the secret key he knows how to forge MAC and thus the share x 1 must be committed by sending enc pk (x 1 ) to P 2 . P 1 may also publish enc pk (z 1 ) to gain public verifiability of complaints during opening phase.
For the Beaver triple generation, we must first show how to generate shares an unknown random value x, i.e., form a valid tuple x 1 , x 2 , enc pk (x 1 ), z 1 , z 2 . For that P 1 generates x 1 ← M pk and publishes enc pk (x 1 ). After that P 2 generates x 2 , z 2 ← M pk and sends c ← enc pk (k) x2 enc pk (−z 2 ) to P 1 who sets
To open the secret sharing [[x] ] to P 1 , P 2 must release x 2 and z 1 after what P 1 can abort if
To open the secret sharing [[x] ] to P 2 , P 1 must release x 1 and the randomness r 1 so that P 2 can test enc pk (x 1 ) = enc pk (x 1 ; r 1 ).
As the cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, it is straightforward to securely compute To prove correctness of P 2 , we can use standard bootstrapping trick, which uses two potential multiplication triples to get a validated Beaver triple, see for example [DPSZ12] .
As additively homomorphic encryption schemes tend to have composite message spaces, multiplying with a random k is not as secure MAC as for finite fields. However, if the smallest factor p of message space is large (like for the Paillier encryption), the resulting security guarantees is sufficient, since z ≡ kx (mod n) implies z ≡ kx (mod p). The same argument can be used to justify verification of Beaver triples.
Finally, note that the problem of low triple throughput can be solved with by using a lattice based additively homomorphic encryption with a massively vectorised message space. Essentially, we can use the same cryptosystem as in [DPSZ12] but with parameters which only assure additive homomorphism. The resulting cryptosystem is more efficient but must execute CDSZKMUL protocols. Hence, it is difficult to say whether this alternative is more efficient or not without practical experiments.
Conclusions
To summarise, we showed how one can build universally composable zero-knowledge protocols based on dual-mode commitments and homomorphic encryption. Since the standard dual-mode commitments are also based on homomorphic encryption, our construction can be based solely on homomorphic encryption. Moreover, we showed how to construct very efficient CDSMUL and CDSZKMUL protocols and combine them with various crypto-computing frameworks. More importantly, the slowdown factor compared to protocols without zero-knowledge proofs is less than 10.
We acknowledge that our protocol is not round-optimal, as there are theoretical constructions for zero-knowledge in three rounds. However, these are not as efficient. Similarly, our protocols are not the best in terms of online communication, as there are zero-knowledge protocols with constant communication in the trusted setup model, e.g. [Gro10] . However, these protocols use stronger security assumptions (bilinear parings combined with unfalsifiable assumptions) and the size of public parameters is really large for these protocols.
In terms of practical performance our protocols are comparable to the zeroknowledge protocols based on sigma protocols where the security against malicious verifiers is achieved by committing the challenge at the beginning of the protocol. These protocols are more rigid against dynamic change of security levels. In particular, the gain in efficiency is smaller when the prover abruptly decides to go from full security to honest verifier zero knowledge, as the commitment is already computed and sent. The latter is a drawback in the covert model where parties randomly alter security levels during the computations to discourage cheating.
Finally, note that conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) is often used as a tool to one step beyond linear operations. For example, it is possible to securely evaluate greater than predicate using CDS protocols [BK04, LL07] . As somewhat fully homomorphic encryption (SFE) remains additively homomoprhic even if we have exhausted all multiplication operations, it is possible to combine CDS with SFE to extend the set of functions computable with SHE without extending itsmultiplicative depth.
B Composability in the Standard Model
The proof of Theorem 3 hinges on the fact that simulation construction depicted in Figure. 3 works without rewinding. Let us now consider the standard model setting, where each party P i generates a commitment key of a perfectly binding commitment, which is shared through all sessions of CDSZK proof where P i acts as a prover. In this setting, we must extract the randomness of the verifier by rewinding. If the CDSZK protocol is executed in isolation, i.e., all side computations are suspended then we can use standard knowledge-extraction techniques. For clarity, we omit all terms that are constant wrt varying t form time-bounds. Lemma 1. Assume that a commitment scheme is (κ, t)-hiding and the CDSZK protocol is executed in isolation. Then there exists a O t log(1/δ) ε−κ time knowledge extractor which fails with probability at most δ provided that verifier passes the check a = answer pk (q, s; r) with probability at least ε and its running-time is bounded by t.
Proof (Sketch). The knowledge extraction strategy is straightforward. Simulate the provers first reply by sending a commitment to zero. Since the overall running time of the malicious verifier V * is below t the probability that V * releases the correct randomness (s, r) can decrease by κ. Markov inequality assures that the probability that V * has not released correct randomness (s, r) after 2 ε−κ rewindings is at most 1 2 . Thus, after log(1/δ) · 2 ε−κ rewindings the failure probability must be below δ.
Corollary 2. CDSZK protocols are secure in the standalone model in the sense that, for any desired failure probability ε, we can construct a simulator that runs in time O t log(1/ε) ε−κ and fails the simulation with probability ε.
Proof (Sketch). For the proof we modify the simulator constructor in in Figure. 3 by replacing the equivocal commitment with knowledge extractor from Lemma 1. That is, the simulator first rewinds V * to get correct randomness (s, r) and in case of success commits to s as expected. In case of a knowledge-extraction failure, the simulator commits zero and hopes for the best. Let ε(a) denote the probability that V * gives a correct randomness after the commitment from honest prover P. Then by doing O log(1/ε) ε−κ rewindings we can assure that (s, r) is recovered with probability ε whenever ε(a) ≥ ε. The cases where ε(a) < ε do not matter, since for these cases the simulator has to open the commitment with probability at most ε and thus rarely fails.
Clarification. Security guarantees captured by Corollary 2 are comparable with any other proof relying on black-box knowledge extraction technique. In the framework of asymptotic security, this result guarantees security in the weak polynomial security model. That is, we can choose any positive power c > 0 such that the simulation failure decreases asymptotically O(k −c ) wrt to the security parameter k, while the simulator construction is still polynomial. However, we cannot find a single polynomial-time simulator such that simulation failure is asymptotically negligible, i.e., O(k −ω(1) ). To hide this fact, one often considers asymptotic of expected running time instead strict running-time, as the latter formally allows to achieve negligible simulation error.
Corollary 3. CDSZK protocols are sequentially self-composable in the standard model provided that validity of public keys can be assured.
Proof (Sketch). The proof is based on the observation that we can simulate each protocol instance similarly to Corollary 2 and all these simulators are sequentially executed. As consequence, it is straightforward to show that failures sum up linearly. As a small but important detail, note that if a malicious prover manages to use invalid public key, then the server-privacy is not guaranteed in the initial CDS phase of the proof and we cannot establish soundness guarantees. Therefore, we need public verifiability of public keys or parties must execute a dedicated zero-knowledge protocol for proving correctness of public keys before executing any of CDSZK protocols.
Security of other composition types. The simulation construction sketched through Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 can be generalised for more complex settings. More precisely, the knowledge-extraction is guaranteed to work as long as we can efficiently simulate the actions of honest prover until the verifier releases the randomness.
For instance, note that parallel execution of many CDSZK protocols is secure, as we can simulate commitments to all secrets at the same time. Since the commitment is hiding the simulation is no different from isolated execution. However, not all all selfcompositions lead to an efficient simulation. As a concrete example, consider a case where a CDSZK instance is embedded between the commitment and release message of another protocol instance. As the messages of the innermost protocol are not simulatable without rewinding, one must first extract s form it and then span outwards. If such embedding in done for all protocols, we quickly reach exponential number of rewindings. Hence, only well-aligned concurrent compositions, where no answercommit-release-decommit modules are in-lined between a commit-release module, are efficiently simulatable without dual commitments. This can be enforced by the prover, if it delays decommitments in case of potential conflicts.
The same restriction holds for other composition types, as well. As long as we can efficiently simulate all messages of a prover sent after the commitment and before the randomness release, the CDSZK protocol remains secure in this context. For instance, note that the asymmetric crypto-computing framework described in Subsection 6.1 has an interesting property that the server is prover in all CDSZK proofs and sends only encryptions to the client. As the client does not know the secret key, these encryptions can be simulated by encryption zeroes. Hence, CDSZK protocols can be arbitrarily scheduled as long as they remain well-aligned wrt each other. The same claim holds also for the symmetric crypto-computing framework described in Subsection 6.2, since the only decryptable elements released by the prover are random encryptions of zeroes and ones. An analogous analysis can be done also for the protocols described in Subsection 6.3.
C Equivocal Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
Computational soundness of the the CDSZK protocol does not follow from computational binding without extra assumptions on the CDS protocol. We say that a CDS protocol is (t eq , ε)-equivocal if there exists a t eq -time equivocation algorithm equiv sk .
More precisely, let r be the randomness space for the protocol. Then for every invalid query q ∈ Q inv , s 0 , s 1 ∈ S and r 0 ∈ R, we should get r 1 ← equiv sk (q, s 0 , s 1 , r 0 ) such that answer pk (q, s 0 ; r 0 ) = answer pk (q, s 1 ; r 1 ). The algorithm might fail for some inputs, however, the distributions r 0 and r 1 must be statistically ε-close for any q ∈ Q inv and s 0 , s 1 ∈ S.
Lemma 2. Assume that the CDS protocol is (t eq , ε)-equivocal. Let a 0 denote a correct reply answer pk (q, s 0 , r 0 ) for s 0 ← S and randomness r 0 ← R. Let r 1 denote the equivocation value equiv sk (q, s 0 , s 1 , r 0 ) for s 1 ← S. Then distributions (a 0 , s 0 , r 0 ) and (a 0 , s 1 , r 1 ) are ε-close for any q ∈ Q inv .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary q ∈ Q inv . By definition the distributions of r 0 and r 1 are statistically ε-close for any values of s 0 and s 1 . Consequently, the statistical distance between the distributions (s 0 , r 0 ) and (s 1 , r 1 ) is bounded by ε, since s 0 and s 1 are identically distributed. Let a 1 = answer pk (q, s 1 , r 1 ). Then distributions (a 1 , s 0 , r 0 ) and (a 1 , s 1 , r 1 ) also ε-close, as the first element can be computed from the other two. The definition of equivocability also implies that a 0 = a 1 only if r 1 = ⊥. Since triples with r 1 = ⊥ are clearly distinguishable from elements of (a 0 , s 0 , r 0 ), the statistical distance does not change if we consider the distribution (a 0 , s 1 , r 1 ) instead of (a 1 , s 1 , r 1 ). Hence, we have proved that the distributions (a 0 , s 0 , r 0 ) and (a 0 , s 1 , r 1 ) are ε-close.
Hence, we can consistently lie about underlying secret value whenever the prover submits q ∈ Q inv . The latter provides an efficient way to get double openings and allows us to reduce soundness to computational binding.
Theorem 5.
If the commitment scheme is (2t, ε 1 )-binding and CDS protocol is (t eq , ε 2 )-equivocal, then for any (t − t eq )-time prover P * :
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that some adversarial algorithm P * violates the claims. Then we can consider the following adversary A with hardwired (sk, pk) against the binding property.
